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ARBITRATOR DIVERSITY:  
CAN IT BE ACHIEVED? 
SARAH RUDOLPH COLE* 
ABSTRACT 
The 2018 lawsuit Jay-Z brought against the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA) because the list of twelve arbitrators AAA provided in a 
breach of contract dispute did not include a black arbitrator highlighted 
ongoing concerns about the lack of diversity in the arbitrator corps. Given 
arbitration’s already less formal structure, one method for enhancing its 
legitimacy among diverse disputants would be to ensure greater diversity 
among those empowered to make decisions. Increasing diversity of neutral 
rosters––and more importantly, of the arbitrators ultimately selected from 
those rosters––may improve the public’s perception of the fairness and 
impartiality of the arbitration process. Increasing arbitrator diversity will 
have other benefits as well, including enhancing equal protection, equal 
opportunity, and complete participation norms. 
This Article suggests approaches that arbitration providers and 
participants in the arbitral process might adopt to enhance diversity in 
arbitrator selection. In particular, this Article posits that, while party 
control over arbitrator selection is a hallmark of arbitration, unbridled 
party selection may play an integral role in reducing diversity in the 
arbitrators selected. Among other things, winnowing to a single arbitrator, 
which the parties often undertake with relatively little information, may lead 
parties to rely on heuristics that incorporate explicit or implicit biases. One 
way to combat such concerns may be to reduce—at least at the margins—
the extent of party control over the selection process. More specifically, 
adjusting the selection process to include a limited appointment aspect, 
rather than the traditional strike and rank approach, may substantially 
promote diversity while still preserving a strong role for party participation 
in arbitrator selection. In addition to direct arbitrator appointment, this 
Article explores other approaches that might enhance diversity in the 
arbitrator corps, including creating permanent panels of arbitrators, 
publicizing information about individual arbitrators, and implementing 
arbitrator evaluation processes. The proposed approaches would retain a 
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strong role for party autonomy in the selection process while also providing 
a greater likelihood for diversity in the outcome of that selection process, 
in turn enhancing public perceptions of the fairness of arbitration as a 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, Jay-Z and his company Rocawear sued the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA) because the list1 of twelve arbitrators AAA 
provided in a breach of contract dispute did not include a black arbitrator.2 
 
1. In this article, I will refer to several terms to describe the manner in which arbitrators are 
selected. An arbitrator “roster” identifies those arbitrators who an institution deems qualified to hear a 
particular kind of case. For example, AAA has more than 7,000 arbitrators on its employment 
discrimination roster. When a dispute arises, if the parties do not select an arbitrator on their own, AAA 
(or other institutions) will create an arbitrator “list”: a set of ten to twelve arbitrators sent to both parties 
in an arbitration. In a traditional domestic arbitration, each party will strike unacceptable arbitrators from 
their lists and then rank the remaining arbitrators. The arbitrator with the best joint ranking will be 
appointed, if that arbitrator accepts the appointment. 
2. See Helen Holmes, Jay-Z Halting His $204M Lawsuit Over a Lack of Black Arbitrators 
Could Be Historic, OBSERVER (Nov. 29, 2018, 3:35 PM), https://observer.com/2018/11/jay-z-halts-laws 
uit-black-arbitrators-historic/ [https://perma.cc/LY33-A55Q]; Petitioners’ Memorandum of Law in 
Support of the Order to Show Cause for a Temp. Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 2, 
Carter v. Iconix Brand Group, Inc., No. 655894/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 28, 2018) (No. 10) https://iapp 
s.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?documentId=OKWHhclQknoQGpPTpxidCg==&s
ystem=prod [https://perma.cc/98WE-VRVJ]. AAA and other arbitral provider organizations provide 
parties with a list of arbitrators before the arbitration begins, as described in the previous note. Here, the 
twelve-arbitrator list provided to the parties did not include a black arbitrator. Jay-Z’s attorneys 
complained about this, and AAA sent them six additional names. Of those six, however, Jay-Z claimed 
that one arbitrator was Asian American, another was South Asian, and a third arbitrator was Latino. 
Only three of the arbitrators appeared to be black––two men and one woman––and one of the black 
arbitrators was a partner at a law firm representing Jay-Z’s adversary in the underlying arbitration. 
Holmes, supra. 











After an unsatisfactory e-mail exchange with AAA, Jay-Z and his counsel 
argued that the lack of black arbitrators on AAA’s complex commercial 
arbitration roster was a violation of the artist’s constitutional rights to equal 
protection of the laws and equal access to public accommodations. Jay-Z 
also contended that this absence of diversity violated consumer protection 
laws by misleading consumers into believing they would be able to receive 
a fair and impartial adjudication in arbitration. Putting aside the merits of 
Jay-Z’s constitutional and consumer protection claims, as well as the 
validity of his contention that a non-black arbitrator could not provide him 
a fair hearing, the underlying concern Jay-Z expressed about the lack of 
diversity in the arbitrator corps resonates with the public as well as with 
minority disputants and one-shot players––such as consumers or 
employees––and their representatives. Many commentators believe that the 
lack of diversity among arbitrators undermines the integrity of the 
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) process.3 Given arbitration’s already 
less formal structure, 4  one method for enhancing its legitimacy among 
minority disputants would be to ensure greater diversity among those 
empowered to make decisions.5 Increasing the diversity rates of arbitrators 
on neutral rosters––and more importantly, of the arbitrators ultimately 
selected from those rosters––will likely improve the public’s perception of 
 
3. David Hoffman and Lamont Stallworth observed that “the lack of racial and ethnic diversity 
in the ranks of neutrals may cause society to lose confidence in the fairness of private dispute resolution, 
leading legislators, regulators and the courts to reverse the policies that now support ADR.” David A. 
Hoffman & Lamont E. Stallworth, Leveling the Playing Field for Workplace Neutrals: A Proposal for 
Achieving Racial and Ethnic Diversity, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 37, 39 (2008). Other commentators levy 
similar critiques. See, e.g., Theodore K. Cheng, The Case for Bringing Diversity to the Selection of ADR 
Neutrals, 9 N.Y. DISP. RESOL. LAW. 18, 19 (2016), https://theocheng.com/documents/The-Case-for-Bri 
nging-Diversity-to-ADR-Neutrals-(NYSBA-New-York-Dispute-Resolution-Lawyer).pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/4M67-82S8]; Beth Trent, Deborah Masucci & Timothy Lewis, The Dismal State of Diversity: 
Mapping a Chart for Change, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2014, at 21; Maria R. Volpe, Robert A. Baruch 
Bush, Gene A. Johnson, Jr., Christopher M. Kwok, Janice Tudy-Jackson & Roberto Velez, Barriers to 
Participation: Challenges Faced by Members of Underrepresented Racial and Ethnic Groups in 
Entering, Remaining, and Advancing in the ADR Field, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119, 119–21 (2008); 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial Arbitration: Challenges, 
Opportunities, Proposals, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 297, 377 (2014) (“The identity and background of 
decision makers makes a difference, and our growing understanding of the impact of these elements on 
process and product in dispute resolution must be communicated and translated into action.”). 
4. Arbitration is a dispute resolution process wherein parties select a third-party neutral (or 
neutrals) to hear the evidence in their case and then issue a final and binding decision. 
5. Commentators have observed that the diversity of the arbitrator corps has not kept up with 
the change in diversity of the workforce. The lack of diversity among arbitrators undermines the 
credibility of the process because disputants do not believe that the arbitrators can identify with their 
realities as employees or consumers. Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Impact of the Growth and Use of ADR 
Processes on Minority Communities, Individual Rights, and Neutrals, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 789, 801 
(2011) (“The pool of neutrals has been primarily white males, especially in labor, construction, and 
commercial disputes.”); Sasha A. Carbone & Jeffrey T. Zaino, Increasing Diversity Among Arbitrators: 
A Guideline to What the New Arbitrator and ADR Community Should Be Doing to Achieve This Goal, 












the fairness and impartiality of the arbitration process.6 Increasing arbitrator 
diversity will have other benefits as well, including enhancing equal 
protection, equal opportunity, and complete participation norms. 
Arbitration critics correctly observe that the arbitrator corps does not 
reflect the racial, ethnic, or gender diversity present in society at large.7 
Institutional efforts to alter this dynamic have historically been ineffective, 
although it would appear that recently redoubled efforts are gaining some 
ground.8 Yet there is little question that more could be done.  
This Article will begin by addressing some of the reasons why increasing 
diversity in the arbitrator corps may serve important objectives, such as 
enhancing public perceptions of the legitimacy of the arbitral process, 
augmenting equal protection, and improving opportunity for potential 
arbitrators. It then considers the various levels in the arbitrator selection 
process at which diversity concerns can arise—the roster level; the list-
creation level, when a list of arbitrator names is provided to the parties in a 
particular matter; and the arbitrator-selection level, when the parties 
ultimately select the arbitrator who will hear their case. While arbitration 
providers have taken significant strides in recent years to increase roster 
diversity, increased roster diversity is not entirely translating into a 
corresponding increase in the diversity of arbitrators who are ultimately 
appointed. Yet, unquestionably, it is the actual selection of diverse 
arbitrators to hear cases that is essential for achieving the goal of 
 
6. Jennifer Coffman, The American Arbitration Association’s Commitment to Diversity, 63 
DISP. RESOL. J. 31 (2008). 
7. Ben Hancock, A Look at ADR and Diversity; Older White Males Lead the Ranks of Neutrals, 
39 NAT’L L.J. 1, 1–2 (2016) (finding that the arbitrator corps is “arguably the least diverse corner of the 
legal profession,” and most arbitrators, especially in high stakes disputes, are older white males); F. 
Peter Phillips, It Remains a White Male Game (NLJ), INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. 
(Nov. 27, 2006), https://www.cpradr.org/news-publications/articles/2006-11-27-it-remains-a-white-mal 
e-game-nlj [https://perma.cc/G6MW-9LR4]; David H. Burt & Laura A. Kaster, Why Bringing Diversity 
to ADR Is a Necessity (ACC), INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. (Sept. 30, 2013), https:/ 
/www.cpradr.org/news-publications/articles/2013-09-30-why-bringing-diversity-to-adr-is-a-necessity-
acc [https://perma.cc/MJ8V-L548]; see also Deborah Rothman, Gender Diversity in Arbitrator 
Selection, 18 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 22, 23 (2012). Even the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA), an organization that regulates U.S broker-dealers, does not have diverse arbitrators, according 
to the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association (PIABA):  
There are 6,383 arbitrators, according to FINRA. PIABA’s analysis of disclosure reports for 
5,375 past and current securities arbitrators from as far back as 1991 found that 80 percent of 
arbitrators were male. PIABA also analyzed 2,118 disclosure reports it had complied [sic] from 
2013–14. Of those, the average age was 66 and more than 78 percent were men.  
Suzanne Barlyn, Wall Street Arbitrators’ Lack of Diversity is Harmful: Group, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2014, 
9:41 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-finra-arbitration-idUSKCN0HW1EM20141007. The 
College of Commercial Arbitrators (CCA), a group of experienced arbitrators, also has little gender 
diversity. Approximately 15% of CCA arbitrators are women. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 363–64, 
363 n.330 (of the 234 members, 36 are female). 
8. F. Peter Phillips, Diversity in ADR: More Difficult to Accomplish than First Thought, DISP. 
RESOL. MAG., Spring 2009, at 14. 











legitimizing the arbitration process.9 
The Article next considers why an increase in diversity at the roster level 
may not be translating into an increase in diversity of selected arbitrators 
and suggests approaches that arbitration providers and participants in the 
arbitral process might adopt to address this issue. In particular, the Article 
posits that, while party control over arbitrator selection is often seen as a 
hallmark of arbitration, unbridled party selection may play an integral role 
in reducing diversity in the arbitrators selected. Among other things, 
winnowing to a single arbitrator, which the parties often undertake with 
relatively little information, may lead parties to rely on heuristics that 
incorporate explicit or implicit biases. One way to combat such concerns 
may be to reduce—at least at the margins—the extent of party control over 
the selection process. More specifically, adjusting the selection process to 
include a limited appointment aspect may substantially promote diversity 
while still preserving a strong role for party participation in arbitrator 
selection.10 
For example, in most arbitrations, each party receives an identical ten- 
or twelve-person arbitrator list from which each party confidentially strikes 
unacceptable arbitrators and ranks those remaining. Upon receipt of that 
information from both parties, the provider appoints the arbitrator who has 
the best joint ranking. To achieve greater diversity in appointments, 
however, the parties could agree––or arbitral institutions could provide, as 
a default rule––a hybrid selection process. For example, parties could agree 
to strike six arbitrators from the typical ten-arbitrator list by using three 
alternate strikes each, and the arbitral provider itself could then select from 
the remaining four candidates.  
Alternatively, rather than ranking arbitrators in strict order, the providers 
could request the parties to label each arbitrator on the list “acceptable” or 
“not acceptable,” with the arbitral provider then selecting among those that 
both parties have identified as “acceptable.” Such approaches would retain 
a strong role for party autonomy in the selection process while also 
providing a greater likelihood for diversity in the outcome of that selection 
process, in turn enhancing public perceptions of the fairness of arbitration 
as a dispute resolution mechanism.  
 
9. This is not to suggest that the only purpose in diversifying the arbitrator corps is to legitimize 
arbitration as a process in the eyes of those who are required to use it. Increasing arbitrator diversity will 
also enhance equal protection and complete participation norms more generally.  
10. Direct arbitrator appointment from its National Roster has enabled AAA to create greater 
opportunity for women and minorities to be selected. According to an e-mail from Neil Currie, AAA’s 
Vice President in 2019, the National Roster is 33% diverse and appointments from that roster have been 
32% women and minorities. E-mail from Neil Currie to author (Feb. 3, 2020, 03:00 CST) (on file with 
author). These numbers are about 10% higher than when the parties use other selection mechanisms, 












I. THE IMPORTANCE OF DIVERSITY IN IMPROVING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 
OF ARBITRATION AS A LEGITIMATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS 
Arbitration scholars, arbitrator providers, and arbitration advocates11 are 
unified in their interest in and concern about ensuring and advancing 
diversity among arbitrators.12 The interest in increasing diversity among the 
arbitrator corps has been heightened over the last several years––even 
before the Jay-Z case publicity. Arbitration providers, perhaps in response 
to public and media pressure and society’s increased focus on the 
importance of diversity, have turned inward and scrutinized their own 
practices. Ultimately, all of the major providers have increased focus on 
diversity, through expanding their rosters, implementing more focused 
recruiting methods to bring on board more arbitrators with diverse 
characteristics, and influencing public policy through the creation of 
diversity pledges, diversity committees, and the like. 
When attempting to improve diversity, organizations that provide 
arbitrators and mediators typically focus on increasing diversity in many 
forms on neutral rosters.13 The AAA Diversity Committee, for example, 
suggests that diversity14 encompasses gender, race, ethnicity, age, religion, 
 
11. Alex Spiro, the lawyer who represented Jay-Z, said:  
Given that arbitration clauses have become ubiquitous for large corporations and regular people 
buying Starbucks gift cards, it is crucial that arbitrations operate fairly. . . . Part of what that 
means is that they protect all people equally under the law. And what that means—at least to 
me—is that there ought to be some choice for people in the process to at least have the option 
of selecting among a diverse slate of arbitrators. 
Darlene Ricker, Jay-Z’s ADR Problems: Mogul’s Case Spotlights Lack of Diverse Arbitrators, ABA 
JOURNAL (May 1, 2019, 2:50 AM) http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/jay-z-adr-problems [htt 
ps://perma.cc/XDS6-NCRQ]. Different groups may have different interests regarding diversification of 
the arbitrator corps. For example, academics may believe that diversity is important for non-market-
based reasons. The provider organizations have financial incentives to ensure that arbitration is widely 
accepted; they likely wish to do whatever is possible to minimize criticisms of the process. Litigants 
may be interested both in actual justice and perceptions of justice. Finally, arbitrators––particularly, 
prospective arbitrators––may have an interest in a diversity push as a means of overcoming historical 
and status-quo impediments to professional advancement. 
12. AAA asserts that its commitment to diversity is long-standing, going back as far as 1968 
when it “established the National Center for Dispute Settlement to help ease urban crises through 
arbitration and mediation” and in 1979 “co-sponsored the first National Women’s Arbitrator 
Development Program to establish a method for recruiting and training qualified women arbitrators.” 
Diversity and Inclusion Initiatives, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2020), https://www.adr.org/DiversityInitiatives [ht 
tps://perma.cc/CVD4-FNH3] [hereinafter AAA Diversity Initiatives]. AAA also describes a recent, 
multi-year effort to diversify its roster––thus, although its commitment to diversity may be long-
standing, AAA became much more focused on its efforts in the last five to ten years.  
13. Throughout this article, I will use the term “diverse neutrals” as the ABA defines it in its 
Resolution 105: “minorities, women, persons with disabilities, and persons of differing sexual 
orientations and gender identities.” AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 105 (2018). 
14. Much time could be devoted to defining what “diversity” is and critiquing the definition of 
“diversity” adopted by the major ADR provider organizations. In a recent article, Maria Volpe––also 
discussing diversity in ADR––observed that there is little consensus on what “diversity” means and 
 











and sexual orientation, and it seeks to include on its rosters those who have 
had little opportunity to participate in the dispute resolution field due to their 
identities.15 
One might ask why dispute resolution provider organizations, and those 
who utilize arbitration, view as critical the goal of improving diversity in 
arbitrator appointments. Reference to the arguments Sally Kenney offered 
in support of greater diversity in the judiciary may be helpful here. Kenney 
found that diversity among judges is essential, even though women judges 
do not make decisions any differently than male judges.16 In particular, 
Kenney emphasized that the judicial process lacks legitimacy if women are 
not provided an opportunity to participate, “notions of fairness demand 
representation” of women on the bench, the symbolism of appointing 
female judges “breaks a powerful taboo in our society,” women judges 
disrupt the narrative that only white men can mete out justice, and finally, 
and most importantly, “gender merits representation.”17 These arguments 
offer powerful support for increasing diversity by sex as well as by race in 
the arbitrator corps, particularly as more and more disputes are sent to 
arbitration.18 
Although arbitration is under fire for a variety of reasons,19 the lack of 
diversity in the arbitrator corps unquestionably adds to the perception of 
 
described it as a “socially-constructed concept [that] has come to have many meanings depending on the 
context.” Maria R. Volpe, Measuring Diversity in the ADR Field: Some Observations and Challenges 
Regarding Transparency, Metrics and Empirical Research, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 201, 203 (2019). 
The focus here will be on the potential benefits of “diversity” as the organizations have defined it. 
15. AAA Diversity Initiatives, supra note 12. 
16. Kenney discusses the research on this topic, citing a number of studies finding minimal 
differences between how women and men judge. SALLY J. KENNEY, GENDER AND JUSTICE: WHY 
WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY REALLY MATTER (2012). One study of federal district judges “found male 
judges to be more liberal and women more likely to defer to government,” but no “significant 
differences” between the judges’ rulings involving women’s rights or criminal policy issues. Id. at 29 
(citing Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and 
Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596 (1985)). After an extensive review of the empirical studies on this 
topic, Kenney concluded that “[d]ifferences mostly do not exist” between how men and women judge. 
Id. at 42. Interestingly, Pat Chew, conducting an empirical study of arbitrators, found that though 
research has demonstrated a gender effect for female judges in sexual harassment and sex discrimination 
cases, there is not a similar gender effect among female arbitrators. Pat K. Chew, Comparing the Effects 
of Judges’ Gender and Arbitrators’ Gender in Sex Discrimination Cases and Why It Matters, 32 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 195 (2017). Other researchers found judges’ gender had an impact on decision-
making in sex discrimination cases heard in federal appellate courts. Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & 
Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010). 
17. KENNEY, supra note 16, at 176–79. 
18. Given Professor Chew’s findings that women arbitrators do not decide sex harassment and 
sex discrimination cases differently than male arbitrators (as, apparently, judges do), Chew, supra note 
16, at 216–17, Kenney’s explication of the need for women judges even if there is no gender effect in 
judging seem especially apt. 
19. Arbitration, which is often characterized as a process that is “forced” on consumers and 













arbitration as an unfair and unbalanced process that is geared against “the 
little guy,” particularly when that “little guy” is a woman and/or a member 
of a minority20 group. Addressing diversity concerns may help convince 
disputants that an arbitral forum is a fair and neutral setting where justice is 
done and is seen to be done. If this could possibly be the outcome, methods 
for increasing diversity in the arbitrator corps are certainly worth 
exploration.21  
Moreover, the more frequent appearance of diverse arbitrators on rosters 
and lists will likely normalize these less typical arbitrators and ultimately 
increase the willingness of litigants and general counsel––who are 
responsible for arbitrator selection––to step outside their comfort zone and 
select new arbitrators.22 Diverse rosters, together with more information 
 
that “forced” arbitration is problematic because it is private. See Maria R. Volpe, Measuring Diversity 
in the ADR Field: Some Observations and Challenges Regarding Transparency, Metrics and Empirical 
Research, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 201, 205 (2019) (arguing that parties’ faith and trust in dispute 
resolvers is more important than trust in decision makers in the public justice system because the 
informal and confidential nature of arbitration and mediation creates greater concerns about their overall 
fairness and neutrality). Critics also argue that arbitration typically precludes similarly situated claimants 
from joining together to pursue class relief against businesses or employers, does not necessarily use 
rules of evidence and procedure, and provides only limited appeal rights. In addition––and perhaps most 
troubling––some claim that businesses, who may be repeat players in the arbitration process, have an 
increased likelihood of success in arbitration because of their greater knowledge of the process and 
potentially closer connections with the decision makers. See Mark L. Egan, Gregor Matvos & Amit 
Seru, Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 
25150, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25150 [https://perma.cc/5KA9-9WNG] (stating that 
securities firms take advantage of their knowledge of arbitrators’ propensities in decision making when 
selecting arbitrators). Evidence does not support all of these claims, and arbitration processes have been 
reformed in order to address other concerns. However, there is no question that many currently view 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements, particularly those governing consumer and employment disputes, as 
problematic––hence, the phrase “forced arbitration.”  
20. In using the term “minority,” I intend to include persons of African-American or Latino 
descent, who have historically been victims of discrimination and not considered for appointment as 
arbitrators. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Underrepresentation of Minorities in the Legal Profession: A 
Critical Race Theorist’s Perspective, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1005, 1009 n.8 (1997) (quoting Lewis A. 
Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the Legal Profession: The Role of 
Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 861–62 (1995) (defining minorities as 
African-American and Latino)). 
21. To ensure public acceptance of arbitration as an appropriate substitute for litigation, 
arbitrators should be representative of the individual litigants who appear in front of them. See Burt & 
Kaster, supra note 7; Weatherspoon, supra note 5, at 801 (“The lack of diversity in the pool of potential 
neutrals raises suspicion among minorities who must use the ADR process to resolve their dispute.”). 
22. Normalization of gender- and race-diverse arbitrators may well help arbitrator provider 
organizations reach their goals of diverse arbitrator selection better reflecting population numbers. 
Something like the NFL’s “Rooney Rule,” which required NFL teams to interview at least one minority 
candidate when hiring a new head coach, could be applied to arbitration to encourage litigants and their 
counsel to research a larger pool of arbitrators and become familiar with new and different arbitrators. 
See Rooney Rule Leaves a Legacy and Impact Far Beyond NFL, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 14, 2017), 
https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/04/14/ap-fbn-rooney-rule [https://perma.cc/MQ5G-QQGN]; Mike 
Freeman, The Rooney Rule 10 Years Later: It’s Worked… Usually, and We Still Need It, BLEACHER 
REPORT (Oct. 24, 2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1822988-the-rooney-rule-10-years-later-its 
 











about arbitrators (a point to be addressed later), will likely result in greater 
diversity in the selection of arbitrators. 
II. ARBITRATOR SELECTION PROCESSES 
Arbitration literature emphasizes that one of the primary benefits of 
choosing arbitration is the parties’ ability to select the decision maker for 
the dispute.23 Most disputants use an arbitrator provider organization to 
administer their arbitration, such as AAA. These provider organizations 
typically maintain a roster of arbitrators, categorized based on subject-
matter expertise and location. In addition to subject-matter expertise, 
provider organizations ensure that each arbitrator has arbitration or other 
decision-making experience; a legal background, although this is not a strict 
requirement; and, more recently, a background or identity that would 
provide diversity on the roster.  
Providers’ arbitrator selection processes largely follow the same 
approach, with the exception of AAA’s consumer arbitrator selection 
process. A typical default selection rule is AAA’s Employment Arbitration 
Rule 12(c). Pursuant to this rule, AAA sends simultaneously to each party 
a letter containing an identical list of ten names chosen from the 
Employment Dispute Resolution Roster. AAA encourages the parties to 
select a mutually acceptable arbitrator from the list as their arbitrator. If they 
fail to do so, “each party to the dispute shall have 15 days from the 
transmittal date in which to strike names objected to, number the remaining 
names in order of preference, and return the list to the AAA.”24 AAA’s 
Labor Arbitration Rules (R-10 through R-12) and their Commercial 
Arbitration Rules (R-12c) follow the same pattern. JAMS, another leading 
arbitration service provider formerly known as Judicial Arbitration and 
Mediation Services, Inc., uses a similar approach but does not send as long 
a list to the parties: JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures, 
Rule 15(b) specifies that JAMS will send the parties a list of at least five 
 
-worked-usually-and-we-still-need-it [https://perma.cc/VL5Y-DCRJ]. In other words, if diverse 
arbitrators appear on the lists sent to parties, commercial litigants and their counsel––who tend not to be 
diverse along race, gender, and socio-demographic lines––would be compelled to research and consider 
new and different arbitrators. This exposure to diverse arbitrators may help the litigants and their 
counsel, who do not intend to be consciously biased, become more comfortable with selecting a diverse 
arbitrator. 
23. Although this is often touted as a major benefit of arbitration, it is doubtful that the process 
of alternate name striking results in either side ending up with their preferred arbitrator. It is more likely 
that the process will result in an arbitrator who is not particularly well known to either party. If this is 
true, it undermines the popular rationale for not selecting a diverse arbitrator: that such arbitrators are 
not well-known to either side. If anything, the existing process should result in the selection of the less 
familiar arbitrator.  
24. AM. ARB. ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R-












arbitrator candidates in cases that require a sole arbitrator and ten arbitrator 
candidates in cases that require a tripartite panel.25 JAMS also provides each 
party with a brief description of the background and experience of each 
arbitrator candidate. The parties have seven days to strike up to two names 
if they are selecting a sole arbitrator and three names if they are using a 
tripartite panel. Following these strikes, each party must rank the remaining 
candidates in order of preference.26 
AAA takes a different approach to consumer arbitration,27 allowing for 
direct appointment of arbitrators from AAA’s national roster. AAA may 
have adopted this approach because consumers are frequently 
unrepresented, have little ability to learn about arbitrators in the short time 
available, and want to be certain that the arbitrator selection process is not 
controlled by the repeat-player business. Thus, AAA’s consumer arbitration 
rules allow appointment of an arbitrator from AAA’s national roster, unless 
the parties have agreed on a different arbitrator.28  
Under the basic arbitrator selection process described above, 
diversifying the arbitrator corps could take multiple forms. First, arbitrator 
provider organizations might focus on diversifying their arbitrator rosters, 
adding more diverse neutrals to the total number of arbitrators available to 
the disputing parties. Increasing diversity on the various rosters––
employment, commercial, labor, etc.––will enable the arbitrator provider 
organizations to construct more diverse lists of arbitrators to send to parties. 
 
25. JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures, JAMS (July 1, 2014), https://www.ja 
msadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/5R S3-XXTE]. 
26. CPR follows a similar process. Rule 6.2(b) of the CPR Administered Arbitration Rules states:  
CPR shall provide to the parties a list, drawn in whole or in part, from the CPR Panels, of not 
less than five candidates if one arbitrator is to be selected, and of not less than seven candidates 
if two or three arbitrators are to be selected. Such list shall include a brief statement of each 
candidate’s qualifications, availability and disclosures in writing of any circumstances that 
might give rise to justifiable doubt regarding the candidate’s independence or impartiality as 
provided in Rule 7. Each party shall number the candidates in order of preference, shall note 
any objection it may have to any candidate, and shall deliver the list so marked to CPR, which, 
on agreement of the parties, shall circulate the delivered lists to the parties.  
2019 Administered Arbitration Rules, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://www.cpradr.org/resource-center/rules/arbitration/administered-arbitration-rules-2019 [https://pe 
rma.cc/RFK3-L9U7]. 
27. AAA applies its consumer arbitration rules 
whenever a contract between a business and a consumer specifies the AAA as administrator (or 
incorporates the AAA rules into the contract) and: (1) the business has a standardized, 
systematic application of arbitration clauses with customers; (2) the terms and conditions of the 
purchase of standardized, consumable goods or services are non-negotiable or primarily non-
negotiable in most of all of its terms, conditions, features, or choices; and (3) [t]he product or 
service must be for personal or household use.  
Christopher R. Drahozal, AAA Consumer Arbitration, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE 
FOR AMERICANS OF AVERAGE MEANS 478, 480 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2017). 
28. AM. ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES R-16 (2014), https://adr.org/sites/default/ 
files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE3J-TANK] [hereinafter AAA Consumer Arbitration 
Rules].  











Second, arbitral providers can take steps to ensure, or at least increase the 
likelihood, that the ten- or twelve-candidate arbitrator list they provide to 
parties will be more diverse. Recently, for example, AAA offered parties 
the opportunity to be provided a list of potential arbitrators that was at least 
20% diverse on the basis of sex or race. Finally, most critical to improving 
diversity in those who hear cases is increasing the selection of arbitrators 
who provide greater diversity. It is at this point that efforts to diversify the 
arbitrator corps tend to break down, because arbitrator providers typically 
do not control who is ultimately selected as an arbitrator. Given the 
emphasis on improving the selection of diverse arbitrators and its 
importance to providers and others, focusing on both party selection and the 
processes designed to increase diversity in that selection is especially 
critical. 
III. CURRENT EFFORTS TO DIVERSIFY THE ARBITRATOR CORPS 
Historically, few diverse neutrals have graced arbitral organization 
rosters, particularly for more complex commercial disputes. Each major 
arbitrator provider has placed considerable emphasis on improving diversity 
in its arbitrator roster and in the process of arbitrator selection, with varying 
degrees of success.  
AAA, the largest arbitrator provider organization, promotes its arbitrator 
corps as “the most qualified and exceptional arbitrators––possessing 
judicial capacity, temperament and extensive industry knowledge, 
experience and acceptability to parties. Candidates applying to the roster are 
typically prominent in their fields and have subject matter expertise . . . .”29 
At a minimum, AAA arbitrators on AAA’s national roster must have fifteen 
years of “senior level legal, business or professional experience,” 
educational degrees, experience in area(s) of expertise, and, among other 
things, training in arbitration.30  
More recently, AAA amended its mission statement and policies to 
encourage greater focus on diversity and inclusion on their neutral roster, as 
well as in their work more broadly.31 In 2012, AAA reported that its Roster 
 
29. AM. ARB. ASS’N, APPLICATION PROCESS FOR ADMITTANCE TO THE AAA NATIONAL 
ROSTER OF ARBITRATORS 1, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/application_p 
rocess_for_admittance_to_the_aaa_national_roster_of_arbitrators.pdf [https://perma.cc/3F59-Z8PP]. 
30. Id. at 3. 
31. The AAA’s mission page also emphasizes diversity, promoting “impartial and fair treatment 
of all people with whom we come in contact, regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, age, religion, sexual 
orientation, or other characterization.” AAA Mission, Vision and Commitment to Diversity and Inclusion, 
AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/MissionVisionCommitment2Diversity [https://perma.cc/6LYU-
K5LB] [hereinafter AAA Mission]. It also highlights the organization’s efforts to train diverse 













of Neutrals was 23% diverse for gender and race.32 From 2014 to 2017, 
AAA increased its efforts to diversify its roster and the panels of rosters it 
sends out to parties for their selection. In 2014, AAA reported that, of the 
306 new arbitrators added to the roster that year, 25% were women and 31% 
were women or minorities.33 In 2015, 41% of the new arbitrators added to 
AAA’s rosters were diverse by race or gender and 78% of the candidate lists 
AAA sent to parties were at least 20% diverse.34 In 2017, 45% of new 
additions to the roster were women or minorities or both.35 AAA reported 
that its case management teams paid attention to diversity when they sent 
out lists of prospective arbitrators to parties––albeit sending out lists that 
were “as diverse as the parties’ requirements would allow.”36 These efforts 
resulted in candidate lists that had at least 20% diversity of race and gender 
in 87% of cases. In 2018, AAA reported that its appointments were 27% 
diverse.37 AAA is clearly aware that while roster diversity is important, the 
key statistic to actual arbitrator diversity is how many diverse appointments 
are made. Although membership on a roster is a first step to such 
appointment, the ultimate issue in improving arbitrator diversity is 
overcoming the hurdle of selection. AAA appears to be making strides in 
that direction. 
AAA’s efforts are multifaceted. In addition to active efforts to recruit 
more diverse arbitrators, AAA has endeavored to increase diversity in other 
ways. For example, AAA established a one-year fellowship for newer 
dispute resolution professionals from historically underrepresented groups. 
This program, the A. Leon Higginbotham Jr. Fellows Program, is intended 
“to provide training, mentorship and networking opportunities to up and 
coming diverse alternative dispute resolution professionals who have 
 
alternative dispute resolution.” Id. Further, the AAA Diversity Committee’s mission, as stated in 2017, 
was “to promote the inclusion of those individuals who historically have been excluded from meaningful 
and active participation in the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) field.” Diversity Initiatives, AM. 
ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/diversityinitiatives [https://perma.cc/KD4W-3L3N]. 
32. Carbone & Zaino, supra note 5, at 34. 
33. AM. ARB. ASS’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 14 (2015), https://www 
.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/2014_Annual_Report_Financial_Statements_0.pdf [htt 
ps://perma.cc/5VHL-MFZV]. 
34. AM. ARB. ASS’N, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 26 (2016), https://www 
.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/2015_AAA_AnnualReport_Financials_0.pdf [https://p 
erma.cc/97N5-VL7R]. 




37. AM. ARB. ASS’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 6 (2019), https://www. 
adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA_2018_Annual_Report_and_Financial_Statement
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM42-LTVB].  











historically not been included in meaningful participation in the field of 
alternative dispute resolution.”38  
JAMS also actively promotes its commitment to diversity. According to 
its website in 2017, it “outpace[d] the AmLaw 250 with an overall 
composition of 22% female and 9% persons of color among our 
distinguished panelists.”39 JAMS encourages the businesses with whom it 
works to consider using gender and racially diverse neutrals, tracks usage 
of diverse neutrals, and encourages outside counsel to “consider diversity in 
their selection of ADR professionals.”40  JAMS offers parties “diversity 
inclusion language” that they can include in dispute resolution clauses. That 
language is the following: “The parties agree that, wherever practicable, 
they will seek to appoint a fair representation of diverse arbitrators 
(considering gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation), and will request 
administering institutions to include a fair representation of diverse 
candidates on their rosters and list of potential arbitrator appointees.”41 
The International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution (CPR), 
a third major provider of dispute resolution services, created a diversity 
pledge. Signatories to this pledge confirm their belief in the importance of 
diversity and inclusion among neutrals and actively support selecting 
diverse arbitrators and mediators. It also asks that other parties to disputes 
include “qualified diverse neutrals among any list” of neutrals they propose 
to the signatories. 42  In 2018, CPR added a Diversity Statement to 
nomination letters sent to parties. 43  The language of the statement 
emphasizes CPR’s commitment to diversity and inclusion in dispute 
resolution, informs parties about the ways diversity improves the quality of 
decision-making, and encourages them to be aware of the role that implicit 
bias can play in the arbitrator selection process. In 2020, CPR added a 
 
38. AAA Mission, supra note 31.  
39. We Embrace Diversity, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/diversity/ [https://perma.cc/W4YX-
LAJL].  
40. Id. 
41. JAMS Clause Workbook, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/clauses/#Diversity [https://perm 
a.cc/5BPE-BM8P]. 
42. Burt & Kaster, supra note 7. The pledge states: “We ask that our outside law firms and 
counterparties include qualified diverse neutrals among any list of mediators or arbitrators they propose. 
We will do the same in lists we provide.” National Task Force on Diversity: Diversity Commitment, 
INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., https://www.cpradr.org/programs/committees/diver 
sity-task-force-adr/Diversity-Pledge [https://perma.cc/Z2PV-8DXF]. 
43. CPR Adds Diversity Statement to DRS Nomination Letter to Further Promote Diversity in 














Diversity and Inclusion model clause for parties who wish to pre-commit to 
a diverse neutral in a three-person panel.44 The model clause states: 
The parties agree that however the arbitrators are designated or 
selected, at least one member of any tribunal of three arbitrators shall 
be a member of a diverse group, such as women, persons of color, 
members of the LGBTQ community, disabled persons, or as 
otherwise agreed to by the parties to this Agreement at any time prior 
to appointment of the tribunal.45 
In addition, acknowledging that the only path to diversity in dispute 
resolution is ensuring that diverse candidates are selected as arbitrators, 
CPR was joined by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)–
–which provides arbitration and mediation services in the securities 
industry, both for claims by customers against brokers and employment 
claims against brokerages––and the Leadership Council on Legal Diversity, 
to launch a training program for diverse candidates becoming mediators and 
arbitrators.46 The program, which began in pilot form in 2016, provides 
diverse participants the opportunity to develop neutral skills and gain access 
to professional dispute resolution opportunities through “(a) formal training 
in mediation and arbitration skills and practical observational experience; 
(b) mentoring by skilled neutrals; and (c) networking opportunities within 
CPR’s commercial dispute resolution community via attendance at these 
organization’s events at no cost or at a discount.”47 
FINRA’s diversity picture is remarkably similar to that of the other 
providers. FINRA publishes annual surveys that disclose the demographics 
 
44. CPR Continues to Pioneer in Diversity Space, with Launch of Diversity & Inclusion Model 




a11-a811-000d3a31ebb1 [https://perma.cc/G8CN-JYL7] [hereinafter CPR Diversity & Inclusion Model 
Clause].  
45. Id. 
46. CPR, LCLD & FINRA Program Aims for Actual Selection, Not Just Training, of Diverse 





[https://perma.cc/7BWH-JXKR] [hereinafter CPR Program Aims for Actual Selection]. In 2016, the 
program trained six participants. In 2017, five participants were enrolled. Id. In 2020, CPR reported that 
the program continues. INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., 2020 ANNUAL REVIEW 7 
(2020), https://www.cpradr.org/about/annual-review/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/FinalAnnualRevie 
wCorrected.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WLC-F5BY]. 
47. CPR Program Aims for Actual Selection, supra note 46. 











of its arbitrators and mediators.48 As of 2019, the “overall roster” percentage 
of African Americans was 9%.49  Only 5% of FINRA’s arbitrators and 
mediators were Hispanic.50  And just 29% of FINRA’s arbitrators were 
female.51 Like the other providers, FINRA is focusing on diversifying its 
arbitrator roster, engaging in an “aggressive campaign to recruit new 
arbitrators” and focusing particularly on recruiting arbitrators from “diverse 
backgrounds, professions, and geographical locations.”52 FINRA is, among 
other efforts, conducting outreach to numerous minority and women’s 
organizations and networking and hosting events with diversity-based 
organizations. FINRA’s executive vice president, responsible for dispute 
resolution, stated: “It’s vitally important that our pool of arbitrators reflects 
the varied backgrounds of the parties who use the FINRA arbitration forum. 
We have bolstered our recruitment efforts, both in terms of increasing the 
numbers and diversity––in age, gender, race, and occupation––and continue 
working toward this goal.”53 
The American Bar Association (ABA) is also engaging in efforts to raise 
awareness about the lack of diversity among dispute resolution neutrals and 
to change attitudes about diversity among those who select neutrals––
typically outside counsel in law firms. ABA Resolution 105, adopted in 
2018, states: 
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges providers of 
domestic and international dispute resolution to expand their rosters 
with minorities, women, persons with disabilities, and persons of 
differing sexual orientations and gender identifies (“diverse 
neutrals”) and to encourage the selection of diverse neutrals; and  
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges 
all users of domestic and international legal and neutral services to 
select and use diverse neutrals.54 
Resolution 105 identifies numerous action steps for clients, inside 
counsel, outside counsel, neutrals, and dispute resolution services providers. 
Clients and inside counsel are encouraged to “[s]elect diverse neutrals 
whenever possible,” use the JAMS diversity inclusion language in their 
agreements, take public diversity pledges like the one CPR created, and 
 
48. Our Commitment to Achieving Arbitrator and Mediator Diversity at FINRA, FINRA, https:// 
www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation/our-commitment-achieving-arbitrator-and-mediator-diversity-finr 
a [https://perma.cc/FMY2-KF7Z].  
49. Id.  
50. Id.  
51. Id.  
52. Id. 
53. Id. 












raise the diversity issue with outside counsel and with providers.55 The ABA 
encourages outside counsel to do much of the same, and also to ask 
providers to provide diverse lists of arbitrators and give parties the 
opportunity to become familiar with diverse neutrals.56 Even neutrals have 
a role—they are encouraged to appoint diverse neutrals as chairs of 
arbitration panels (where two panelists select the third panelist, who serves 
as chair of the arbitration panel), nominate or sponsor diverse neutrals for 
membership in dispute resolution organizations that require such actions, 
and mentor prospective or active diverse neutrals.57 
IV. IN LIGHT OF THESE EFFORTS, WHY ISN’T THE ARBITRATOR CORPS 
MORE DIVERSE?  
The most common explanation for the lack of arbitrator diversity is the 
“pipeline problem.”58 For example, while “women make up about half of 
all graduating law students,” women arbitrators participate in only 6% of 
commercial arbitrations. 59  CPR suggests that the “pipeline problem” 
explains the lack of arbitrator diversity: “The pipeline, in its most basic 
sense, refers to the chain of education, experiences, associations, and job 
positions that can ultimately lead to a career as an arbitrator.”60 Because 
women are underrepresented in the professional positions that supply the 
ADR community—judges, law firm partners, general counsel, etc.—fewer 
women enter the arbitrator corps.61 The pipeline hypothesis also explains 
why minorities are underrepresented in commercial matters. Without the 
 
55. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA RESOLUTION 105 - DIVERSITY IN ADR: SUMMARY AND ACTION 





58. Caley E. Turner, “Old, White, and Male”: Increasing Gender Diversity in Arbitration 
Panels, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.cpradr.org/news 
-publications/articles/2015-03-03--old-white-and-male-increasing-gender-diversity-in-arbitration-pane 
ls [https://perma.cc/68KG-SYZ7] (“On the supply side, many scholars blame what is referred to as a 
‘pipeline problem’ for keeping women out of the arbitration field.”). 
59. Id. Additionally, “the Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) reported that of 
more than 550 neutrals who serve on its worldwide panels, about 15% are women and 14% are 
minorities.” N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, IF NOT NOW, WHEN? ACHIEVING EQUALITY FOR WOMEN 
ATTORNEYS IN THE COURTROOM AND IN ADR 11 (2017) (citing Ben Hancock, ADR Business Wakes 
Up to Glaring Deficit of Diversity, LAW.COM (Oct. 5, 2016)), https://nysba.org/NYSBA/Sections/Comm 
ercial%20Federal%20Litigation/ComFed%20Display%20Tabs/Events/2019/Spring%20Meeting%20
Materials/Article-If%20Not%20Now,%20When.pdf [https://perma.cc/J34Y-CF8F].  
60. Turner, supra note 58. 
61. Id. Another study found that, in 2018, about 23% of law firm partners were women, 2% were 
black, 3.5% were Asian, and 2.5% were Hispanic. NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT, INC., 2018 REPORT 
ON DIVERSITY IN U.S. LAW FIRMS 9 (2019), https://www.nalp.org/uploads/2018NALPReportonDiversit 
yinUSLawFirms_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/AVV5-R235]. 











opportunity to gain experience in all aspects of the legal profession, it is 
challenging to build a reputation as a commercial arbitrator.62  
The lack of diversity among arbitrators is particularly stark in the area of 
commercial arbitration. If parties in a commercial arbitration dispute have 
determined that expertise in banking and finance law is essential, a 
prospective arbitrator will only be included on a candidate list if he or she 
has a requisite level of specialized knowledge in those areas. Keeping with 
the pipeline hypothesis, it would appear that diverse neutrals are 
underrepresented in commercial arbitration because they have fewer 
opportunities to develop the skills and knowledge necessary to navigate 
these disputes. 63  The hypothesis also explains why more women and 
minorities are appointed to non-commercial arbitrations than to commercial 
arbitrations.  
The AAA reports racial and gender diversity for each of its major 
divisions: labor (34%), employment (40%), commercial (26%), and 
construction (17%).64 These figures support the pipeline hypothesis; a lack 
of diversity is most prevalent in fields from which women and minorities 
have traditionally been excluded.65 This hypothesis also explains why fewer 
women arbitrate “big-money” cases. A 2014 ABA Section of Dispute 
Resolution study found an “inverse relationship between the amount of 
money in dispute and the likelihood that a woman would be chosen as the 
arbitrator or mediator to help resolve the matter.”66 If arbitrator experience 
and/or familiarity with the arbitrator are the critical factors in deciding 
which arbitrator to appoint when the case involves high stakes, it is not 
surprising that women and minorities are underrepresented in commercial 
matters.  
 
62. “The AAA requires that applicants have a minimum of 10 years of senior level business or 
professional expertise or legal practice prior to being considered for the [National Roster of Neutrals].” 





63. See Turner, supra note 58.  
64. E-mail from Neil Currie to author (Oct. 19, 2020, 12:42 CST) (on file with author). AAA’s 
efforts to diversify its neutrals appear to be bearing some fruit, as the diversity numbers reported in 2012 
were “labor (27%), employment (42%), commercial (17%), construction (10%), and insurance (20%).” 
Carbone & Zaino, supra note 5, at 34. With that said, there remains much room for improvement.  
65. See, e.g., John T. Baker, Black Lawyers and Corporate and Commercial Practice: Some 
Unfinished Business of the Civil Rights Movement, 18 HOWARD L.J. 685 (1975) (discussing the dearth 
of black lawyers in commercial and business practices as a result of discriminatory practices and 
institutionalized racism). 
66. Ben Hancock, ADR Business Wakes Up to Glaring Deficit of Diversity, LAW.COM (Oct. 5, 













The pipeline hypothesis also explains why the federal judiciary enjoys 
somewhat greater racial diversity than the arbitrator corps. In 2019, roughly 
13% of active Article III federal judges were African-American, and 
approximately 9% were Hispanic. 67  Moreover, approximately 73% of 
sitting judges were male, while 27% were female.68  While commercial 
disputes require arbitrators to have extensive experience and knowledge in 
their respective fields of law, judicial appointments frequently turn on other 
factors. For example, judges need not have any particular legal experience. 
Moreover, judging is a full-time job, attracting a younger and more diverse 
group of lawyers seeking full-time work and thus increasing the likelihood 
of a diverse pool. It is the rare arbitrator who makes her living through 
arbitration alone––the lack of steady work, together with a routine demand 
for significant experience in a particular field, draws many retired judges 
and more senior or retired lawyers with specialized knowledge. Finally, a 
critical difference between judges and arbitrators is that judges are assigned 
to cases, rather than appointed. Thus, if diverse judges are on the bench, 
diverse judges will hear cases. In arbitration, the result is not nearly as 
probable. Ultimately, then, it appears that the demographic disparities 
between the arbitrator corps and the federal bench are indicative of a 
“pipeline problem” aggravated by the existing arbitration selection process. 
V. ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS TO DIVERSIFY THE ARBITRATOR ROSTER 
DO NOT RESULT IN SELECTION OF ARBITRATORS WITH DIVERSE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
To address this “pipeline problem,” each of the organizations described 
above focuses on diversifying the arbitration roster, as described in Part III, 
while at the same time encouraging clients to commit to selecting arbitrators 
who are diverse. The creation and use of diversity pledges, diversity 
commitments, diverse arbitrator recruitment, and mentorships and 
fellowships for prospective diverse arbitrators are laudable efforts by the 
various arbitral organizations. In addition, commentators offer other 
suggestions to the major providers, encouraging them to provide training 
and mentoring to diverse arbitrators.69 They also recommend that diverse 
 
67. Danielle Root, Jake Faleschini & Grace Oyenubi, Building a More Inclusive Federal 





69. See Rothman, supra note 7, at 25–26; Carbone & Zaino, supra note 5, at 34–35. Another 
approach might be for lawyers and clients to use a presumption in favor of selecting a gender diverse 
neutral on a multi-member panel. Gina Viola Brown & Andrea K. Schneider, Gender Differences in 
 











arbitrators increase their visibility by pursuing pro bono or reduced fee work 
along with speaking or teaching opportunities for the lawyers and 
businesspeople who might ultimately be responsible for selecting 
arbitrators.70 While all of these suggestions are useful, they do not seem 
sufficient to overcome the major obstacle facing any prospective arbitrator 
on a roster: being selected. The commitment to diversifying the roster and 
offering mentoring, training, and networking––admirable as it is––is 
unlikely to change who is selected to be an arbitrator.71 
Nor are entreaties to businesses to select arbitrators from diverse 
backgrounds likely to change selection outcomes. It is odd that businesses, 
who long ago committed to ensuring diversity in business and hiring 
practices, 72  often abandon that commitment when selecting neutrals. 73 
Institutional expression of a commitment to the selection of qualified 
neutrals does not seem to translate into the actual selection of diverse 
neutrals.74 Even when provided with candidate lists that include diverse 
neutrals, businesses seem to default to arbitrators who are either judges or 
experienced litigators––frequently with backgrounds similar to those who 
select them.75 This approach predominantly results in the selection of older, 
white, male arbitrators, because these arbitrators likely have the most 
 
Dispute Resolution Practice: Report on the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Practice Snapshot Survey 
21 (Marq. Univ. Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-04, 2014). 
70. Carbone & Zaino, supra note 5, at 35–36. 
71. Deborah Rothman explained that women arbitrators are rarely selected because women are 
not represented well among major litigation partners and in-house counsel––those most likely to select 
arbitrators. Rothman, supra note 7, at 24. Also working against women arbitrators is that most major 
law firms keep records and information about arbitrators they have previously selected. Because a lawyer 
does not want to be blamed for picking an arbitrator with whom others are unfamiliar, new arbitrators, 
who are often women or minorities, are often overlooked. Id. at 24–25. Rothman also suggests that 
implicit bias may prevent well-qualified women from being selected as arbitrators. Id. at 25. 
72. Theodore K. Cheng has noted that corporations and their legal departments have committed 
to diversity, often requesting that proposals for legal work include diversity among those who will likely 
work on the matter. Cheng, supra note 3, at 18. 
73. See Burt & Kaster, supra note 7. Cheng observes this phenomenon as well, noting that 
“corporations persist in pursuing an outdated approach to the selection of diverse neutrals,” often 
outsourcing selection, together with the drafting of dispute resolution clauses, to outside counsel. See 
Cheng, supra note 3, at 19. Professor Michael Z. Green observed that companies with robust 
commitments to diversity often ignore those diversity policies when their representatives are selecting 
arbitrators in favor of selecting well-known arbitrators who they think will give them the best chance of 
winning the case for their clients. Michael Z. Green, Arbitrarily Selecting Black Arbitrators, 88 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2255, 2270–73 (2020). This disconnect between party and representatives often leads 
to the selection of non-diverse arbitrators. Id. 
74. Christopher K. Poole, Talking Diversity: An Important Topic for ADR, JAMS ADR BLOG 
(July 14, 2011), https://www.jamsadr.com/blog/2011/talking-diversity-an-important-topic-for-adr [http 
s://perma.cc/76E8-WMVA]. 
75. Hancock, supra note 66 (summarizing a quote from an arbitrator on the JAMS roster who 
said that “attorneys [are driven] to select not only neutrals who are retired judges or former litigators 
with established track records . . . but individuals who share their own background [and are] ‘a mirror 












experience and name recognition.76 So, it seems unlikely that continuing to 
leave the selection process entirely to businesses will result in increased 
diversity among selected neutrals.77 
VI. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Lack of diversity in the arbitrator corps raises the greatest concern in 
what has come to be known as “forced arbitration,” where consumers and 
employees mandated to resolve disputes in arbitration face more powerful 
and experienced opponents. Four possible solutions might address the lack 
of diversity among arbitrators in these kinds of cases: using alternative 
approaches to arbitrator appointment, creating permanent panels of 
arbitrators, publicizing information about individual arbitrators, and 
implementing arbitrator evaluation processes.78  
A. Alternative Appointment Approaches 
First, arbitral institutions, like AAA, could expand their rules to permit 
direct appointment of arbitrators in more cases.79  For example, AAA’s 
consumer arbitration rules authorize AAA to appoint an arbitrator from its 
national roster instead of allowing the parties to select the arbitrator using 
 
76. Lawyers in law firms or in-house counsel control the disputes in arbitration. Because these 
“gatekeepers” are disproportionately white, “they tend to appoint someone like themselves, someone 
white, a lawyer, and usually male.” Hoffman & Stallworth, supra note 3, at 41. Prejudice, together with 
concern about the quality of minority and female neutrals, may also be an issue. Weatherspoon, supra 
note 5, at 802–04. See also Poole, supra note 74 (“In terms of selection, the problem stems from the fact 
that attorneys are typically most comfortable recommending to clients . . . [an] arbitrator they have 
previously worked with.”). Poole also raised the issue of supply. Id. Fewer minorities and women appear 
on JAMS rosters because JAMS draws arbitrators who are typically judges or senior partners at law 
firms with ADR experience, and women and minorities are underrepresented in those careers. Id. 
77. While it would be nice to think of this as purely a timing problem that will resolve itself in 
fifteen or so years––when more women and minorities are law firm partners due to diversity pushes by 
businesses––changes in diversity in law firms and businesses have not occurred at as fast a pace as 
proponents of greater diversity hoped. 
78. Another potential solution is the “Ray Corollary,” promoted by prominent labor and 
employment arbitrators Homer C. La Rue and Alan A. Symonette in their article The Ray Corollary 
Initiative: How to Achieve Diversity and Inclusion in Arbitrator Selection, 63 HOW. L.J. 215, 239–40 
(2020), in which they suggested the creation of a national task force that would require the collaboration 
of the ABA, provider organizations, lawyers who select arbitrators, and entities who hire such lawyers 
to develop and implement a plan that would require consideration of candidates from underrepresented 
populations before making a final arbitrator selection in labor and employment cases. 
79. For example, JAMS rules simply assure consumers that they will have “a reasonable 
opportunity to participate in the process of choosing the arbitrator(s).” JAMS MEDIATION, ARB. AND 
ADR SERVS., CONSUMER ARBITRATION MINIMUM STANDARDS (2009), https://www.jamsadr.com/cons 
umer-minimum-standards/ [https://perma.cc/HF6Z-NC9T]. The AAA’s new rules differ from the 
approach taken in traditional arbitration, where an alternative striking method is utilized. See supra note 
1. This process typically does not result in the selection of a diverse arbitrator. See supra notes 58–62 
and accompanying text.  











the traditional striking process. 80  Although AAA follows the parties’ 
selection process, many parties incorporate AAA’s consumer arbitration 
rules into their contracts instead of creating their own selection processes.81 
Because AAA has made strides in increasing the diversity of its arbitrator 
roster, and because most entities who use AAA opt in to AAA’s default 
rules, one would expect to see greater diversity among the arbitrators 
actually appointed to consumer arbitration cases. In fact, this hypothesis has 
been borne out. In never-before published data, AAA reported to this author 
that using this approach, it has diversified the National Roster so that 33% 
of its members are women or minorities, and 32% of consumer arbitrator 
appointments are to women or minorities.82  Thus, it would appear that 
greater diversity can be achieved with the use of direct arbitrator 
appointment. 
In employment disputes, by contrast, AAA follows the traditional 
process for arbitrator selection. If the parties have not appointed an 
arbitrator themselves, AAA sends out a list of arbitrators taken from the 
Employment Dispute Resolution Roster. That roster is diverse by “gender, 
ethnicity, background, and qualifications.” 83  Next, the parties strike 
arbitrators they deem unacceptable and rank the remaining arbitrators in 
order of preference. Then, AAA appoints the arbitrator with the best 
 
80. Under AAA Consumer Arbitration Rule 16, this appointment process is a default. If the 
parties identify another approach to selection, AAA will follow that approach. In addition, the rule 
enables either party to object to an arbitrator’s appointment. AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, supra 
note 28, at R-16 (“Appointment from National Roster”). Prior to 2014, AAA appointed an arbitrator if 
the parties failed to identify a different process for arbitrator selection but did not indicate which roster 
AAA would use to appoint the arbitrator. See AM. ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES: 
SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES C-4 (2005), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer-Related 
%20Disputes%20Supplementary%20Procedures%20Sep%2015%2C%202005.pdf [https://perma.cc/8 
DUX-G6RT] (“Appointment of Arbitrator”). 
81. See Consumer Clause Registry, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://apps.adr.org/ClauseRegistryUI/face 
s/org/adr/extapps/clauseregistry/view/pages/clauseRegistry.jsf;jsessionid=hAFcehxXEkMzDmmpzSIt
HXmp9WXMABG-eC7WzF9_pUvQe3rPtJzK!-150655465?_ga=2.129907977.481484299.160278956 
9-148294854.1548256249 [https://perma.cc/4C3J-WPEA] [hereinafter “AAA Consumer Clause 
Registry”]. AAA requires any business wishing to use AAA arbitrators and administrative services to 
pay a fee to have its consumer arbitration clause reviewed by AAA. Once AAA reviews the clause and 
finds that its content is consistent with AAA rules and the Consumer Due Process Protocol, the clause 
is included in the Consumer Clause Registry. See id. As of October 10, 2020, 638 companies have 
clauses included in the Registry. Id. A review of the Consumer Clause Registry demonstrates that most 
businesses allow AAA to appoint the arbitrator in consumer disputes. For example, 1st Franklin 
Financial Corporation permits AAA to appoint the arbitrator. See Alternative Dispute Resolution 




82. Currie, supra note 10. 
83. See AM. ARB. ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R-












(lowest) composite ranking.84 This process provides no guarantee that a 
diverse arbitrator will be chosen. As noted above, one way to improve 
diversity among arbitrators selected to hear cases would be for AAA, and 
other major arbitral institutions like JAMS and CPR, to adopt AAA’s direct 
approach to arbitrator appointment for consumer disputes in employment, 
commercial, and construction cases. If parties are reluctant to give up the 
ability to select arbitrators in all cases, the arbitral provider organization 
could apply direct arbitrator appointment until a certain threshold––for 
example, in cases with claims of $100,000 or less. Parties could still opt out 
of the arbitrator appointment rule, but if they did not, they would be much 
more likely to see an arbitrator of a different gender or race presiding over 
their dispute. 
A concern with this approach is that parties choosing arbitration to 
resolve their disputes do so partly because of the opportunity to select the 
decision maker.85 If businesses are not inclined to give up this opportunity, 
another approach might be to ensure that the arbitrator lists sent to the 
parties are 40% to 50% diverse.86 If this were the case, the ranking process 
might very well result in more frequent selection of diverse decision makers. 
Why might that be? First, recall that the selection process involves choosing 
a single name from a list of ten potential arbitrators. If eight or nine of those 
on the list are non-diverse, as a matter of basic math, the likelihood that one 
of the one or two diverse candidates would be selected is relatively low. 
Increasing the number of diverse candidates to the 40% to 50% range cannot 
help but increase the likelihood that one of those diverse candidates will 
ultimately be selected. Second, there is another potential effect over time. 
Historically, arbitrator selection lists contained a fairly non-diverse group 
of arbitrators, primarily including former judges and experienced lawyers 
from major law firms.87 As a result, today, a given list may have only one 
female name on it, subtly (or not so subtly) reinforcing the notion that 
 
84. Id. at R-12(c). 
85. Recent evidence suggests that parties may be more willing to give up this privilege, at least 
in the context of a three-arbitrator panel. CPR recently announced its new Diversity & Inclusion Model 
Clause, which allows parties to pre-commit to the selection of a diverse arbitrator on a three-person 
panel. The clause requires the parties to have “at least one member of any tribunal of three arbitrators 
[who is] a member of a diverse group, such as women, persons of color, members of the LGBTQ 
community, disabled persons, or as otherwise agreed to by the parties . . . .” CPR Diversity & Inclusion 
Model Clause, supra note 44.  
86. Providing diverse arbitrator lists may be difficult in some areas, like complex commercial 
disputes and banking/finance. As a result, arbitrator provider organizations may need to expand their 
recruiting. The organizations might follow the lead of FINRA, which has a broader advertising campaign 
to encourage potential arbitrators to apply to become FINRA arbitrators. This past year, for example, I 
received a postcard from FINRA encouraging me to find others to apply to become FINRA arbitrators. 
87. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore, Resurrecting a Dead Horse––Arbitrator Certification as a 
Means to Achieve Diversity, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 483, 483 (1999) (“In 1985, the average arbitrator 
was 59.3 years old, 91.5% of all arbitrators were male, and 96.5% of all arbitrators were white.”). 











arbitrating is a largely male endeavor. Repeated exposure to lists of names 
reflecting greater gender balance may normalize the notion of female 
arbitrators, making it more likely over time that parties will seriously 
consider using female arbitrators.  
Another alternative to the traditional strike-and-rank method would be 
to request that parties label each arbitrator on the list “acceptable” or “not 
acceptable,” with the arbitral provider then selecting among those that both 
parties have identified as “acceptable.” Further, even if traditional strike-
and-rank methods were favored, yet another approach would be for 
providers to adopt a default hybrid selection process (that parties opt into 
by incorporating the provider’s rules in their arbitration agreement), in 
which the parties confer to strike six arbitrators from the typical ten-
arbitrator list using three alternating strikes and then allow the arbitral 
provider itself to select among the remaining four candidates. Both of these 
approaches retain strong party autonomy in the selection process, while also 
providing a greater likelihood for diversity in the outcome of that selection 
process.  
B. Increased Implementation of Permanent Panels 
Another way to diversify the arbitrator corps would be to create a greater 
number of permanent panels of arbitrators that reflect the diversity of the 
population at large. 88  Permanent panels are already a staple of labor 
arbitration in both the public and private sectors.89 In labor arbitration cases, 
each side (union and management) identifies potential arbitrators. Both 
sides then vet the arbitrators and, if they are acceptable to both sides, 
randomly assign or assign by rotation the panel arbitrators to arbitrations as 
disputes arise––typically over a period of time, such as the life of the 
collective bargaining agreement.90 Because both union and management are 
 
88. As David Hoffman has noted, permanent panels are one of the three methods for 
administering workplace dispute resolution. The other two approaches involve the use of an independent 
organization, like AAA or JAMS, to supply a list of prospective arbitrators. Another approach is to select 
arbitrators ad hoc as cases arise. Hoffman & Stallworth, supra note 3, at 38. In labor and employment 
disputes, parties may also “agree on a single individual to serve as a permanent umpire to handle all 
arbitration disputes or a permanent panel of arbitrators from whom they will select an individual to hear 
a particular matter.” Timothy J. Heinsz, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Enterprise 
Wheel Goes Around and Around, 52 MO. L. REV. 243, 280 n.161 (1987). 
89. The American Federation of Government Employees and the Social Security Administration, 
for example, maintain permanent panels of arbitrators. See also Charles A. Borell, How Unions Can 
Improve Their Success Rate in Labor Arbitration, 61 DISP. RESOL. J. 28, 31 (2006) (finding that 
permanent panels are common in labor arbitration); Stephen L. Hayford, The Coming Third Era of Labor 
Arbitration, 48 ARB. J. 8, 9 (1993) (noting that there are large numbers of permanent panels in labor 
arbitration); Heinsz, supra note 88, at 280 n.161. 













committed to the creation of a diverse panel, parties are much more likely 
to see women or minority arbitrators than they would if the panel was 
created by a private arbitral organization. Other institutions utilize 
permanent panels for certain kinds of cases, usually those that are less 
complex. As in the labor-management context, permanent panel arbitrators 
are assigned on a rotating basis to cases, and both sides must agree to an 
arbitrator becoming a member of a permanent panel.91 Utilizing arbitrator 
panels––as opposed to the current approach in most consumer and 
employment cases, which focuses only on diversifying arbitrator rosters––
creates greater diversity in arbitrator selection. 
Establishing a permanent panel of arbitrators to enhance diversity among 
arbitrators in employment disputes is not a new idea. In 2008, David 
Hoffman and Lamont Stallworth recommended the creation of national and 
regional arbitrator panels as a means to improve the diversity of arbitrator 
rosters. But their proposal focused primarily on the question of how to 
improve recruitment, selection, and mentoring of minority dispute 
resolution professionals. The authors identified two programs that were 
offered to achieve these goals: a National Consortium of Minority 
Workplace Neutrals, an initiative proposed by one of the authors; and 
Access ADR, a program created by neutrals that was actually—albeit 
briefly— implemented.92 While there is no doubt that increasing the number 
of minority dispute resolution professionals is a laudable goal, programs 
like Access ADR have not been particularly successful, because they exist 
separate from the mainstream dispute resolution providers.93 To change the 
nature of arbitrator rosters that parties actually use—and, more importantly, 
the arbitrators they select—businesses, consumer and employee groups, and 
the dispute resolution providers must work together to achieve the same 
goal. Resources providing access to minority or gender-diverse neutrals are 
a mere starting point. Only if permanent panels of diverse neutrals are 
created by the arbitral institutions, together with support from businesses 
and input from employees, consumers, and the entities that advocate on their 
behalf, might we experience the kind of diversity among arbitrators that will 
make the arbitration process more acceptable to diverse disputants and more 
effective overall. 
 
of arbitrators to adjudicate grievances during the life of a collective bargaining agreement. Permanent 
panels may be used in complex commercial construction projects, too, where speedy resolution is 
essential. Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration of Employment-
Discrimination Claims, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 789, 815 n.148 (2013) (citing Thomas H. Oehmke & 
Joan M. Brovins, Arbitrator Selection and Service, 97 AM. JUR. TRIALS 319, § 8 (2005)). 
91. See Carbone & Zaino, supra note 5, at 37 (describing permanent panels). 
92. Hoffman & Stallworth, supra note 3, at 43. 
93. I could find no evidence that Access ADR still exists in a 2020 Internet search. 











But how can we ensure that consumer or employee advocacy groups, or 
groups created by plaintiffs’ lawyers, can replicate the efforts of unions to 
propose inclusion of diverse arbitrators on arbitrator panels and promote 
their selection? Bill Gould, former Chair of the NLRB and an experienced 
arbitrator, suggested that employees’ representatives in particular could be 
in a position to identify arbitrators for panels and, later, for selection. He 
believed that, after the landmark Supreme Court case Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,94 “the plaintiffs’ bar in most major cities is 
able to act as an adequate surrogate for organized labor. That is to say, 
counsel, like union representatives, will pass information about their 
experience and judgments about particular arbitrators to one another just as 
employers do in both settings.” 95  A recent review of AAA consumer 
arbitration cases suggests that this may be happening. In a study of over 
5,000 consumer complaints filed with AAA between 2009 and 2013, 
researchers found that “repeat-playing plaintiffs’ lawyers” may have 
“growing clout” in the arbitrator selection process.96 These lawyers could 
work with AAA and business counsel to establish a more diverse panel of 
arbitrators, who could then be assigned randomly to cases. Even if a panel 
was not possible, one would hope that the growing influence of repeat-
playing plaintiffs’ lawyers will serve to ensure selection of arbitrators with 
more diverse backgrounds, as lawyers will likely work to select arbitrators 
who they believe share experiences and beliefs similar to their clients. 
 
94. 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (promoting arbitration as an adequate substitution for litigation). 
95. William B. Gould IV, Kissing Cousins?: The Federal Arbitration Act and Modern Labor 
Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609, 659 (2006) (expressing concern that an employee who cannot afford 
counsel might have difficulty selecting an arbitrator because he or she would be unlikely to have access 
to the resources necessary to make a knowledgeable choice). But see Alexander J. S. Colvin, An 
Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (2011). In this article, Colvin found that repeat-player employers had an advantage in arbitration 
involving employees. Id. at 11–13. One of the reasons for a repeat-player advantage, Colvin concluded, 
was that the “plaintiff attorney bar” was not able “to play a substitute role as a repeat player on behalf 
of employees in employer arbitration akin to the role played by unions in labor arbitration.” Id. at 21. 
Colvin speculated that plaintiff attorneys might be able to play this role if the time came when there 
were a “sufficient number of plaintiff attorneys experienced in employment arbitration accessible to 
employees to be able to counteract employer advantages in this area.” Id. 
96. David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of 
Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 121 (2015). This research debunks the belief that arbitral bias 
against the one-shot players is prevalent. According to Horton and Chandrasekher, there is “little proof 
that private judges are prejudiced against consumers. In fact, our research goes further and casts doubt 
on existing evidence of arbitral bias.” Id. at 120–21. There is also some doubt as to the continued 
existence of the repeat-player advantage in arbitration. See id. at 121. According to Horton and 
Chandrasekher, repeat players do not have as much control over the arbitration process as they did in 
the past; their study considered 1,279 different arbitrators who had presided over 4,839 arbitrations (in 
part because of the AAA arbitrator appointment process). Id. at 121. Thus, the authors concluded that 
“companies no longer have much control over the identity of the private judge.” Id. Although Horton 
and Chandrasekher did not examine the identity of the arbitrators, one might also imagine that more 
minority and female arbitrators presided over these arbitrations, given that so many different arbitrators 












C. Consolidated Information About Diverse Arbitrators 
Another important facet of increasing arbitrator diversity is information 
dissemination. One way to increase information about available arbitrators 
is to develop a website or clearinghouse and invite arbitrators to create 
profiles for free or a relatively low cost. For the arbitrator provider 
organizations, like AAA, information about which arbitrators are on their 
rosters is only available after the parties engage the services of AAA. Of 
course, arbitrators are free to post résumés on their own websites, but the 
vast majority affiliate with organizations that make information about 
arbitrators available only to those who use their services. And even then, 
information about arbitrators is relatively scarce. The arbitrator résumé 
provides fairly basic information about academic and practice background, 
experience in arbitration, representative cases, and hourly rate. Recently, 
AAA offered arbitrators the opportunity to create and post a two-minute 
video about themselves on the AAA webpage. Although this opportunity 
was not explicitly created in order to improve the selection rate for diverse 
arbitrators, one might expect that seeing and listening to an arbitrator with 
whom a party or lawyer is not already familiar might make parties more 
comfortable with selecting that arbitrator. 
The JAMS website contains considerably greater information about its 
arbitrators, including a profile picture and a résumé featuring educational 
background, practice experience, and dispute resolution experience. One of 
the more helpful innovations on the JAMS website is “counsel comments,” 
a platform where counsel who have utilized the services of a neutral may 
offer comments that can be displayed (presumably with the neutral’s 
approval) on the website. The JAMS website is accessible to the public and 
would allow prospective parties a considerably greater opportunity to make 
a diverse choice, because––to some degree––they can identify diverse 
arbitrators from their pictures and résumés. 
CPR’s full list of neutrals is only open to its organizational members. 
The public does, however, have access to its franchise and employment 
panels. Yet even that information is minimal. The panel information does 
not include a picture or any comments; instead, it contains basic information 
about education, professional experience, primary practice areas, dispute 
resolution experience and training, selected honors/awards, publications, 
and participation in professional and civic associations. The section does 
not contain demographic information.97 
 
97. See Find a Neutral, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., https://www.cpradr.o 
rg/neutrals/find-a-neutral (last visited Oct. 10, 2020). If you wish to find a neutral on this site, you must 
first register with CPR. 











Rather than relying on arbitral organizations to provide information 
about arbitrators––given their interest in continuing to allow parties the 
freedom to select the arbitrator they prefer––it may make sense to develop 
a separate website, something akin to arbitralwomen.org. That website is an 
international platform focused on providing greater information about 
international commercial arbitrators who are women.98 Instead of focusing 
on merely one group of people, however, a future website could focus on 
collecting information about diverse neutrals, as defined in ABA Resolution 
105. Such a website might make available pictures, videos, blogs written by 
arbitrators, or even a party review area. Rather than just positive quotes 
about the dispute resolution neutral, this website could feature a series of 
questions answered by parties and counsel following an arbitration, 
including questions like: Did the arbitrator issue the award by the deadline? 
Was the award complete? Did the arbitrator offer reasons for the decision? 
Did the arbitrator manage the hearing efficiently? Did the arbitrator have 
special requests (for example, asking for every document to be mailed as 
well as e-mailed, including any case cited in briefs)? Did the arbitrator pay 
attention during the hearing? Did the arbitrator “split the baby”? 
Similar to arbitralwomen.org, a website of this type already exists for 
federal district court judges and magistrates. Known as “The Robing 
Room,” this monitored website allows lawyers to rate, on a scale from 1 to 
10, federal judges and magistrates on a variety of criteria, including: 
temperament, scholarship, industriousness, ability to handle complex 
litigation, punctuality, evenhandedness in civil and criminal litigation, 
flexibility in scheduling, involvement in settlement discussions, and varied 
criteria related to criminal cases.99  The website also permits lawyers to 
make comments and give judges overall star ratings. The website operator, 
North Law Publishers, reserves the right not to publish a comment or rating 
if it determines that it was not made in good faith or was libelous.100 
D. Published Arbitrator Evaluations 
Arbitral organizations could also begin creating evaluation programs for 
arbitrators, similar to those some states have adopted for monitoring judicial 
performance. The National Center for State Courts has determined that 
seventeen states and the District of Columbia have official programs for 
evaluating judicial performance.101 Of those seventeen states, seven share 
 
98. ARBITRAL WOMEN, https://www.arbitralwomen.org/ [https://perma.cc/8WF9-FAFD]. 
99. THE ROBING ROOM, http://www.therobingroom.com [https://perma.cc/R78G-XA8J]. 
100. FAQs, THE ROBING ROOM, http://www.therobingroom.com/FAQs.aspx [https://perma.cc/JQ 
5U-22WQ].  













judicial performance reviews with the voters when a particular judge is 
subject to a retention election.102 For example, Iowa adopted a merit system 
for selecting judges in 1962. Since that time, the Iowa State Bar Association 
has conducted a Judicial Performance Review as a means to convey relevant 
information to voters about judges subject to retention votes.103 In order to 
rate a judge, attorneys must appear in front of that judge frequently. Those 
attorneys can then rate the judges on six to eight qualities relevant to their 
professional competence, including “knowledge and application of the law, 
perception of factual issues, attentiveness to arguments and testimony, 
management and control of the courtroom, and promptness of rulings and 
decisions.”104 Ratings “range from 1 to 5 with 5 being ‘excellent’ and 1 
being ‘very poor.’”105 Attorneys also rate, on the scale of 1 to 5, various 
aspects of the demeanor of a particular judge, including whether that judge  
avoids undue personal observations or criticisms of litigants, judges, 
and lawyers from the bench or in written orders; decides cases on the 
basis of applicable law and fact, not affected by outside influence; is 
courteous and patient with litigants, lawyers, and court personnel; 
deals with pro se litigants and pro se litigation fairly and effectively; 
and treats people equally regardless of race, gender, age, national 
origin, religion, sexual orientation, socio-economic status, or 
disability and demonstrates an awareness of the influence of implicit 
bias.106 
A similar system could be put into place by any arbitral organization or 
by an independent organization. The system could be comparable to the 
judicial performance evaluation programs described above, which are 
 
102. Id. But see Judicial Performance Evaluation in the States, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
THE AM. LEGAL SYS., https://iaals.du.edu/judicial-performance-evaluation-states [https://perma.cc/7758 
-628X] (only identifying six states that provide such information for retention elections). States 
providing such information to voters include Missouri and Colorado. See, e.g., Farrah Fite, Missouri 
Judicial Performance Review Findings Available to the Public at yourmissourijudges.org, 
YOURMISSOURIJUDGES (Sept. 25, 2018), http://www.yourmissourijudges.org/missouri-judicial-perfor 
mance-review-findings-available-to-the-public-at-yourmissourijudges-org/ [https://perma.cc/6XKS-C 
QKC]. Other states collect responses to their JPEs, but do not share the information with voters. Instead, 
several states provide the information to persons responsible for reappointing judges. Other states 
provide the evaluation information to individual judges for self-improvement purposes. And two states 
provide summary information––without specific information about individual judges––to the public to 
enhance confidence in the judiciary. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra. 
103. The Iowa Bar Association website contains the last twenty-four years of performance 
evaluations for Iowa’s state court judges. Judicial Evaluations, IOWA STATE BAR ASS’N, https://www.io 
wabar.org/page/JudicialEvaluations [https://perma.cc/APF8-658E]. 
















intended to provide information about individual judges based on 
characteristics that the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal 
System and the ABA have deemed relevant. These criteria include 
command of relevant substantive law and procedural rules; impartiality and 
freedom from bias; clarity of oral and written communications; judicial 
temperament that demonstrates appropriate respect for everyone in the 
courtroom; administrative skills, including competent docket management; 
and appropriate public outreach.107  Of course, in creating a system for 
arbitrator performance review, any organization should be mindful of 
criticisms levied at such systems. Several commentators have reported that 
the performance review process (based on an ABA model) is systematically 
biased against women and minority judges.108 
CONCLUSION 
While the arbitrator selection process rarely inspires the kind of 
headlines that Jay-Z’s case generated, in the world of arbitration, the media, 
lawyers, and provider organizations have increased focus on ensuring that 
parties have the opportunity to select from diverse neutrals when appointing 
an arbitrator. Organizing groups of plaintiffs’ lawyers so that they might 
collaborate to develop permanent panels of diverse neutrals and an 
increased use of direct arbitrator appointment may well lead to increased 
diversity among arbitrators actually appointed to hear consumer, 
employment, and other disputes––indeed, direct appointment already 
 
107. See Judicial Performance Evaluation: How It Works, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE 
AM. LEGAL SYS., https://iaals.du.edu/judicial-performance-evaluation-how-it-works [https://perma.cc/6 
8Y5-7B27]. The ABA has issued black letter guidelines for the evaluation of judicial performance, 
focusing on similar attributes with greater detail. See AM. BAR ASS’N, BLACK LETTER GUIDELINES FOR 
THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE (2005), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/p 
ublications/judicial_division/aba_blackletterguidelinesjpe.pdf [https://perma. cc/P85H-2HE2]. 
108. Jennifer K. Elek, David B. Rottman & Brian L. Cutler, Judicial Performance Evaluation: 
Steps to Improve Survey Process and Measurement, 96 JUDICATURE 65, 67 (2012) (reporting that some 
preliminary empirical evidence supports the argument that JPE surveys are biased against minority and 
women judges and that lack of control over who responds—and based on what information—likely 
increases responses based on racial or gender stereotypes). The Report also identifies shortcomings in 
the Judicial Performance Evaluation (JPE) tool that most courts utilize. Among other things, the survey 
is problematic because it uses double-barreled items (i.e. compound questions), such as “judge listens 
with patience and attentiveness,” and language that is too abstract, such as “judge demonstrates 
appropriate demeanor on the bench” and “judge promotes public confidence in the judiciary.” Id. at 68. 
Other commentators have also found JPEs problematic in regard to race and gender considerations. See, 
e.g., NATALIE KNOWLTON & MALIA REDDICK, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., 
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 2 
(2012) (finding that women and minority judges tend to score high in four states’ JPEs, but in a few 
areas tend to score lower, which may be the result of implicit bias, and offering suggestions for 
improvement); Christine M. Durham, Gender and Professional Identity: Unexplored Issues in Judicial 
Performance Evaluation, 39 JUDGES’ J. 11 (2000) (claiming that one-third of female judges in Colorado 
believe they receive less respect from fellow judges and lawyers than do male judges, which may help 












appears to have a positive effect in AAA consumer arbitration cases. If 
increasing diversity among arbitrators is integral to ensuring the procedural 
integrity of the arbitration process, then arbitral organizations should 
increase their efforts to push businesses to draft arbitration clauses that 
authorize direct arbitrator appointment, alternative selection approaches, or 
permanent panels. Additionally, efforts could be made to increase visibility 
of diverse arbitrator candidates and evaluate current arbitrators. As long as 
arbitral organizations are committed to developing and maintaining diverse 
rosters of arbitrators, these approaches will ensure that a much larger 
percentage of arbitrators from diverse backgrounds are actually appointed 
to hear cases––rather than languishing on the arbitrator rosters, never to be 
chosen. 
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